This paper investigates how volatile the general price level can be in an equilibrium where all uncertainty is extrinsic. The government operates a lump-sum redistribution policy using …at money. An approach to modelling asset market segmentation is introduced in which this tax policy determines how volatile the price level can be, which in turn determines the volatility of consumption. The paper characterizes (i) the set of general price levels consistent with the existence of competitive equilibrium and (ii) the resulting set of equilibrium allocations. The results demonstrate that redistribution policies that are …xed in nominal terms can have a destabilizing e¤ect on an economy, and show how to evaluate the amount of volatility that a particular policy may induce.
Introduction
General equilibrium models of money often have the property that competitive equilibrium is indeterminate: there is a continuum of equilibrium values of money for a given economy, each leading to a distinct real allocation (see especially Balasko and Shell [7] ). When extrinsic uncertainty is introduced and asset markets are imperfect, the degree of indeterminacy can expand to be equal to the number of extrinsic states of nature (see Villanacci [22] ). Since these states simply represent the beliefs of agents in the model and have no effect on the fundamentals of the economy, it seems reasonable to think that their number can be arbitrarily large. 1 Thus high degrees of indeterminacy are pervasive in monetary sunspot models, even when there are only small imperfections in asset markets.
Aside from the degree of indeterminacy, however, one might be interested in the volatility of the set of equilibria, that is, the magnitude of the potential variation of prices and consumption across states. Even when the degree of indeterminacy is high, the amount of volatility may be quite low. 2 This paper focuses on the volatility rather than the indeterminacy question. The model presented builds on that of Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Shell [8] , a single-commodity model with extrinsic uncertainty and lump-sum taxes and transfers denominated in fiat money. The degree of nominal indeterminacy is always maximal; it is equal to the number of states of nature even when asset markets are perfect and equilibrium allocations are necessarily Pareto optimal. The amount of nominal volatility, however, is shown to vary with asset market frictions and with government policy. The objective of this paper is to characterize as precisely as possible the amount of nominal volatility, and to show how the interaction of policy and asset market frictions determines how much of this nominal volatility is translated into real volatility, that is, volatility of consumption.
This paper introduces an approach to studying asset market segmentation where consumers are divided into what are termed participation groups. Asset trade between members of different groups is difficult; in the limiting case studied here it is simply impossible. In this sense, asset markets are segmented, or fragmented, along group lines. One interpretation of these groups is as a model of formal and informal credit markets, where a primary group represents the formal market and 1 See Cass [9] and Mas-Colell [18] for arguments to this effect. 2 Cass [10] discusses situations where small asset market frictions lead to high levels of indeterminacy but a ''small'' set of equilibria.
excluded consumers may get together in informal market(s). It may be useful to think of a developing country where the formal sector is an urban area and the informal sector is rural, 3 but this is not the only possibility. Market segmentation also plays a prominent role in the literature on the real effects of monetary policy. 4 The models in this literature typically divide consumers into ''traders'' and ''nontraders,'' so that when the government engages in open market operations, only a fraction of the consumers are on the other side of the market. The present model allows this form of segmentation as a special case, but also allows for secondary markets where nontraders can buy imperfect insurance by trading with other excluded consumers. 5 The government is assumed to operate a redistributive policy in which consumers are given a lump-sum transfer or are required to pay a lump-sum tax that is fixed in nominal terms. This policy generates a perfectly inelastic supply of money (from the consumers who receive a transfer) and a perfectly inelastic demand for money (by the consumers who must pay a tax). When supply and demand are equal, therefore, many different price levels will clear the market. However, it is not the case that the price level can take on any value. If the price of money (the inverse of the general price level) is too high, the real tax on some consumer may be larger than her endowment, so that her tax obligation cannot be met and competitive equilibrium does not exist. Hence, requiring the existence of competitive equilibrium imposes endogenous restrictions on the price of money. A series of articles by Balasko and Shell [5] , [6] , [7] provide analyses of the set of money prices consistent with equilibrium in static and overlapping-generations models without uncertainty. The properties of the set in these environments are now well understood. Peck [20] , for example, shows that for some economies this set need not be connected, while Garratt [13] shows that whether or not the set is connected can depend on the choice of the numeraire.
When there are multiple states of nature, the general price level is a vector consisting of the value of money in each state. In this case, whether a consumer can meet her tax obligation in every state depends on how she is able to transfer wealth across states. This is determined by the asset 3 Hoff and Stiglitz [16] provide an overview of the problems of rural credit markets in developing countries. 4 See, for example, Grossman and Weiss [15] and Rotemberg [21] . 5 The models of Chatterjee and Corbae [12] and Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe [1] endogenously determine which consumers are traders by imposing a fixed cost to participate in the market. This approach could also be taken here, with a notable difference: different consumers would face different costs of participating in each of the (segmented) markets. As an example, one could imagine that in some situations the cost of participating in a market depends on the distance that one lives from it. market prices she faces, which in turn depend on the entire vector of values of money. The first study of the set of equilibrium money prices in an economy with extrinsic uncertainty is provided in Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Shell [8] . They calculate this set for a family of examples, and also show that even when there are perfect asset markets which eliminate real volatility, sunspots can increase the amount of price-level volatility consistent with the existence of competitive equilibrium. In work subsequent to the present paper, Keister [17] extends this model to infinite-horizon economies, focusing on the effects of the resulting no-arbitrage conditions on the set of equilibrium money prices. Both Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Shell [8] and Keister [17] employ two-state models with consumers having identical, logarithmic preferences. The present paper characterizes the set of equilibrium money prices for the general, n-state, one-commodity case (with heterogeneous preferences). The results here provide a foundation for the log-utility approach by showing that some of the important qualitative properties of equilibrium are preserved under the more general preference structure. This paper shows that if the tax-transfer policy generates a reallocation of wealth across participation groups, then there will exist equilibria in which sunspots affect allocations. The intensity of inter-group spot market trade determines the potential magnitude of the sunspot-induced variations. This intensity, in turn, is determined by the value of money in each state. Much of the focus of the paper, therefore, is on characterizing the set of money prices for which competitive equilibrium exists. This set is completely characterized for the two extreme cases, where markets are completely segmented and where there is no segmentation whatsoever.
These sets are then used to provide bounds for the general case of partial market segmentation.
The analysis in this paper points out that efforts by the government to redistribute wealth may have a destabilizing effect on the economy. As an example, consider an economy in which asset markets are segmented in the following way: wealthy consumers trade assets in the formal sector while poor consumers trade in an informal sector. Assume for simplicity that no asset trade is possible between sectors. Now suppose that the government implements a tax-transfer policy designed to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth. This will necessarily involve a net tax on the formal sector and a net transfer to the informal sector, and hence a reallocation of wealth between the two participation groups. Therefore, a quite natural form of market segmentation combined with a common type of fiscal policy leads to the existence of equilibria in which both prices and consumption are excessively volatile. Furthermore, as the government increases the magnitude of the redistri-bution plan, more and more volatile equilibria can be introduced. In order for the government to accurately assess the potential consequences of such a policy, it needs to know the relationship between the policy choice and the amount of volatility in the equilibrium value of money. In other words, it needs to know how the set of equilibrium money prices is determined. Once this set is known, it is possible to calculate the corresponding levels of volatility in consumption, and hence the potential cost of implementing the policy.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the details of the model, including the structure of asset market segmentation. Section 3 then discusses equilibrium conditions in detail, and section 4 analyzes the set of money prices consistent with the existence of competitive equilibrium. Section 5 provides a characterization of the set of equilibrium allocations, and section 6 concludes.
The Model
The model employed here is of an economy with a single commodity and a government that levies taxes and makes transfers in fiat money. It is the fact that some consumers must acquire money in order to pay their taxes that permits the possibility of money having positive value in equilibrium.
There are two periods, labeled zero and one. Period zero is for asset trading only; consumption takes place in period one. At the beginning of period one, one of a finite number n of extrinsic states of nature is revealed to have occurred. These states are labelled fs 1 ; : : : s n g and state s i occurs with probability ¼(s i ). Thus this is an essentially static general equilibrium model enhanced with minimal dynamics so that it can address uncertainty and volatility.
Asset Market Segmentation
The approach to modelling asset market segmentation taken here is a modification of the restricted participation approach introduced by Cass and Shell [11] . 6 Consumers are divided into a set G of disjoint participation groups, which are indexed by g: At time zero, consumers in group g may trade assets in some set A g with each other. In addition, all consumers may trade assets in set A 0 ; this can be thought of as the set of ''internationally traded'' assets. Note that the basic forms of 6 See also Balasko, Cass and Shell [3] .
restricted market participation and incomplete financial markets are both special cases of this setup.
Restricted participation occurs when there are two groups, A 2 is complete state-contingent claims, and A 0 = A 1 = ;: The standard model of incomplete financial markets is a single group with A 0 = A 1 being the (incomplete) asset structure. The setup here is, in turn, a specialization of the generalized restricted participation approach taken by Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi [4] , where the asset portfolio of consumer h is restricted to lie in some set B h : The approach here requires that B h be identical for members of the same group. This requirement captures the notion of segmentation in asset markets and places additional structure on the set of equilibria..
In this paper, attention will be restricted to a special case of the asset structure, where A g is complete state-contingent claims for every group g and A 0 = ;: This is obviously an extreme case, but it leads to considerable simplification and seems a logical starting point for the analysis of participation groups and segmentation.
Consumers
Consumers are indexed by h and have preferences represented by utility functions of the von Neumann-Morgenstern form 
where p 0 g is the vector of contingent-claims prices that prevails in the period zero market in group g: Note that these prices may differ across groups; market segmentation prevents price differences from being arbitraged away. For later reference, note that the first-order necessary condition for c 0 h to solve this problem is that there exist some positive number µ such that
By defining the consumer's tax-adjusted endowment in each state,
it is easy to see that the variables ! h ; p m ; and ¿ h only enter the consumer's demand through their effect on e ! h : This follows from the fact that the budget constraints in (1) can be rewritten as the single constraint
Prices in the asset market are normalized so that
The right-hand side of (3) can therefore be written as
If consumer h is alone in a group, then state-contingent commodity purchases c 0 h must be zero. Equilibrium asset prices in this group must therefore be such that the optimal choice of consumption will be equal to the tax-adjusted endowment in each state,
Such consumers are referred to as being totally restricted.
Fiscal Policy
The vector of taxes across consumers ¿ h = (¿ h ) h2H is called the government's fiscal policy. 7 Since the government will accept only money for the payment of taxes, feasibility requires that the government give out in transfers at least as much money as it demands in taxes. The set of feasible 7 The terminology in this section follows Balasko and Shell [7] .
fiscal policies is therefore taken to be
As in Balasko and Shell [7] , a particular subset of F will prove to be of great interest. A fiscal policy is said to be balanced if the government takes in exactly as much money as it distributes.
The set of balanced fiscal policies is given by
Equilibrium
At several points in the analysis, it will be helpful to examine the relationship between the sunspots economy and the corresponding certainty economy. The certainty economy corresponding to a given sunspots economy is identical in all respects except that there is only one state of nature.
This implies that there is no asset market (or, equivalently, purchases in the asset market must be zero), so that each consumer is formally much like a totally restricted consumer in the sunspots economy. This implies that
A sunspots economy is a list (fV h g ; f! h g ; f¿ h g ; G; ¼) : Both consumer preferences and the probability distribution over states are taken as fixed; an economy is therefore denoted by E (!; ¿ ; G) :
The corresponding certainty economy is denoted E CE (!; ¿ ) : An equilibrium of the sunspots economy is a set of allocations fc h g h2H together with a list of prices 
¿ h for all s i and for all g
and
The set of equilibrium money prices of an economy E (!; ¿ ; G) is denoted P m (!; ¿ ; G) ; or simply
The set of equilibrium allocations for consumer h is denoted C h (!; ¿ ; G), or simply C h :
The set of equilibrium money prices is of interest because the price of money determines the real value of the reallocation of wealth across groups generated by the fiscal policy. This, in turn, determines the potential magnitude of sunspot-induced variations in consumption across states.
A money price vector p m is consistent with equilibrium if and only if at those prices there is an equilibrium in the asset market of each participation group. One method of finding the set P m , then, is to determine the set of money prices leading to the existence of an asset market equilibrium for each group g, denoted P m g . The set of equilibrium money prices for the entire economy is the intersection of these sets, that is,
Equilibrium of the Certainty Economy
First consider the certainty economy, where asset market segmentation plays no role. Recall that in the certainty economy we have
so that consumption is positive if and only if either
holds. Consumers receiving a transfer will always have an after-tax endowment in the consumption set; the focus is therefore on consumers with ¿ h > 0: Let T denote the set of positively taxed consumers. For h 2 T; money prices in the set [0;
) allow consumer h to afford a positive consumption level, so that the set of equilibrium money prices is the intersection of all of these sets,
where the CE subscript indicates that this pertains to the certainty economy. Clearly this is equivalent to defining
(see Figure 1 ). Hence, in the certainty economy the set of equilibrium money prices is a half-open interval with zero as its lowest element. This nominal indeterminacy translates directly into real indeterminacy, with
Equilibrium of the Sunspots Economy
Matters are more complex in the sunspots economy. First, notice that a totally restricted consumer in the sunspots economy is very much like a consumer in the certainty economy. For such a consumer, 
that is, the set of possible money prices is the n-fold Cartesian product of the set of numbers less than the consumer's endowment-tax ratio.
For consumers who have real trading opportunities, the problem is more involved. Even if a consumer has a negative after-tax endowment in some states, she may still be able to afford positive consumption in every state, depending on asset market prices. The assumptions made on preferences and endowments ensure that equilibrium contingent-commodity prices are always positive and finite. Therefore a consumer can afford some bundle in her consumption set if and only if his income in the period zero asset market is positive. From equation (4), therefore, consumer h
Of course, prices p 
Bonafide Fiscal Policies
For some feasible fiscal policies, the price of money in any equilibrium must be zero in every state.
This implies that the economy is essentially non-monetary; the pre-tax and after-tax endowments are identical. Our interest, therefore, is in fiscal policies which permit equilibria where money has positive value. Balasko and Shell [7] term such policies bonafide, since only with them can the government expect in ''good faith'' that its fiscal policy will have real effects.
In the certainty economy, Balasko and Shell [7] show that a fiscal policy is bonafide if and only if it is balanced in the sense of equation (5) . In the sunspot economy, there are two possible 9 In the infinite-horizon model of Keister [17] , this same basic condition appears and is termed the no-bankruptcy constraint. The primary change caused by the longer time horizon is the introduction of additional constraints imposed by arbitrage considerations.
definitions of bonafidelity, which will be called weakly bonafide and strictly bonafide.
Definition:
The fiscal policy ¿ 2 F is weakly bonafide if there is an equilibrium of the economy E (!;
The following two lemmas demonstrate that in the present model these two definitions coincide.
They also demonstrate that a fiscal policy is bonafide (in both senses) if and only if it is balanced, so that the Balasko-Shell result extends to the sunspots economy.
Lemma 1 If a fiscal policy is weakly bonafide, then it is balanced.
Proof. Summing the group market clearing equation (6) across groups and using the aggregate market clearing equation (7) yields
Therefore if p m (s i ) is positive in any state, the fiscal policy must be balanced.
Lemma 2
If a fiscal policy is balanced, then it is strictly bonafide.
Proof. Define
and consider p m (s i ) = a for all s i : Since ¿ is balanced, the after-tax endowment
is a feasible allocation and is, in fact, Pareto optimal. Together with the supporting prices p
10 these constitute an equilibrium.
Combining these two lemmas provides an exact characterization of the set of bonafide fiscal policies.
Proposition 1 A fiscal policy is weakly bonafide if and only if it is strictly bonafide. Such policies are thus referred to simply as bonafide. Furthermore, a policy is bonafide if and only if it is balanced.
Bearing this result in mind, it is interesting to look back at the consumer's single budget constraint given by equation (3) . Each participation group looks like a separate complete-markets economy except in two respects. The first is the obvious remark that the money price vector is common to all groups since all consumers trade in the same spot market in period one. More importantly, the tax-transfer policy need not be balanced within each group. As a result, each group resembles a complete-markets economy in which the fiscal policy can be bonafide without being balanced.
This is the essential contribution of asset market segmentation to the model, and a feature that distinguishes the present approach from the incomplete markets approach. 
The Set of Equilibrium Money Prices
This section describes the set of money prices consistent with the existence of competitive equilibrium for a given economy. The task is broken into cases, depending on the segmentation structure.
The first two cases studied are the polar ones where markets are completely segmented, so that no asset trade takes place, and where there is no segmentation, so that asset markets are perfect. The labels CS and NS will be used to denote these types of economies. The results from these two cases are then shown to provide bounds for the general case of partial market segmentation.
Complete Segmentation
Once the state of nature is revealed, the sunspots economy with complete segmentation is identical to the certainty economy. The result of this is that a vector of money prices p m is consistent with equilibrium in the sunspots economy if and only if each element p m (s i ) is consistent with equilibrium of the certainty economy, i.e., Figure 2 depicts this set for the case n = 2.
11 Antinolfi and Keister [2] use the equivalence of bonafidelity and balancedness to show that even when asset markets are very incomplete, if there is no segmentation then introducing the right set of option contracts eliminates all real volatility. With segmented markets, this result no longer holds. 
This nominal volatility also translates directly into real volatility, with
C h CS = £ C h CE ¤ n :
No segmentation
The situation is, not surprisingly, substantially different when all consumers are in the same participation group. It is well known that in this case an equilibrium allocation must be Pareto optimal, 12 which implies it must be state independent. This does not, however, imply that the price of money must be constant across states. To the contrary, Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Shell [8] provide an example where full market participation leads to an equilibrium with a money price vector that is outside P m CS and is more volatile than any element of P m CS : What matters when there is no segmentation is not the price of money in each individual state, but rather the expected value of the price of money
This statement is formalized in the following proposition, where P m N S denotes the set of equilibrium money prices of 12 See Cass and Shell [11] and, for this specific model, Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Shell [8] .
the sunspot model with no segmentation in asset markets.
Proof. With no segmentation, the equilibrium allocation must be sunspot independent, so that asset market prices are given by p 0 g = ¼: Substituting this into equation (4) yields the income of taxed consumer h;
Since at least one bundle in the consumption set is affordable for consumer h if and only if w h > 0; a consumer with a positive tax requires
: Again letting p m indicate the lowest (positive) endowment-tax ratio; we have
which is clearly equivalent to
An immediate implication of this proposition is that the set of equilibrium money prices when there is complete segmentation is a proper subset of the set when there is no segmentation. This is stated as the following corollary, and shown in Figure 3 for the two-state case.
The equilibrium consumption level of each consumer is constant along a locus of money prices where E[p m ] is constant, since, from equation (9), income depends on p m only through its expected
value. An implication of this is that for each consumer, the set of consumption levels consistent with equilibrium is the same as in the certainty economy, that is,
There is no real volatility, even though there is high nominal volatility relative to the complete segmentation case. It is worth noting that Proposition 1 generalizes to the case of many commodities.
However, Corollary 1 does not, since the set of equilibrium money prices need not be connected in For the case of only two consumers and two states, the result contained in Proposition 2 can be seen in the Edgeworth box. Suppose consumer 2 is taxed one dollar and consumer 1 receives the corresponding transfer.. The aggregate endowment of the economy is fixed, but the distribution of the endowment after taxes depends on the money price vector. Since the box is square, the contract curve is the minor diagonal. The pre-tax endowment must lie on that line, since uncertainty is extrinsic. This is labelled ! in Figure 4 . The relationship between after-tax endowments and money prices is linear and bijective, so that it suffices to find the set of after-tax endowments e ! consistent with equilibrium. Since equilibrium prices p 0 are constant (with p 0 (s i ) = ¼(s i )) along the contract curve, this set is the triangular region depicted in Figure 4 . The linear transformation of this set into price space yields the set P m N S in Figure 3 . A key element in obtaining these results has been the fact that equilibrium contingent-commodity prices are equal to the respective probabilities of their states regardless of the redistribution generated by the tax-transfer policy. 13 When markets are partially segmented, this is no longer true, as the next section shows. 
Partial Segmentation
As mentioned above, the method used for determining the set P m will be to find the set P m g for each group and then to take the intersection of all of these sets. For each consumer, the analysis leading to equation (8) still applies. However, the contingent commodity prices are no longer necessarily equal to the probabilities of their respective states. This is a result of the fact that the aggregate after-tax endowment of a group may vary across states, depending on the vector p m and on the net tax paid by the group. In fact, the situation is qualitatively different depending on the sign of this net tax; each case is analyzed separately.
Balanced Taxation Within a Group
When the net tax on the group is zero, i.e.,
there is no need for spot market trade between this group and any other. In effect, the group can be considered as its own economy and analyzed as in the no-segmentation case studied above. Define
Then, as in Proposition 1,
Notice, however, that this is not the same as 
Positive Taxation of a Group
Now consider the case where the net tax on the group is positive, that is,
holds. First suppose that the tax burdens are uniform within the group, that is, that
is the same for every member of the group. In this case, if the money price vector is such that the after-tax endowment of one consumer is negative in some state, then the aggregate after-tax endowment of the group must be negative in that state as well and there can be no asset market equilibrium. Hence, the set of money prices consistent with equilibrium under uniform tax burdens is the same as in the case of complete segmentation: p m (s i ) must be less than
in every state. When tax burdens are not uniform within the group, however, the consumer with the lowest positive endowment-tax ratio will always go bankrupt when the aggregate after-tax endowment of the group is still positive in every state (and hence p 0 g (s i ) is finite in every state). This is the more interesting case, and hence it is assumed from here on that tax burdens are nonuniform within each group.
A positive net tax implies that the consumption good is more scarce within the group in states with higher prices of money. The contingent-commodity price for these states must therefore be higher relative to the probability with which the state occurs. This well-known fact is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 When
P h2g ¿ h > 0; for any two states s i and s j ;
Therefore, for some h 2 g it must be the case that c h (s i ) < c h (s j ): From equation (2), the first-order condition of consumer h's optimization problem, it immediately follows that
must hold. The same argument applies to the remaining cases, where p m (s i ) < p m (s j ) and where the two money prices are equal.
This lemma says that the price of consumption is high in deflationary states, that is, in states where the value of money is high. Notice, however, that these are exactly the states in which a taxed consumer needs to buy a large amount of consumption in order to pay his tax. Hence, when the price of money becomes high in a particular state, asset market prices move against a taxed consumer and he is driven bankrupt by lower money price vectors than would be the case if p 0 g = ¼ held. Because of this, the set of money price vectors shrinks relative to the balanced taxation case.
An outer bound for the set P m g is now given by the set of money prices that would be consistent with equilibrium if the members of the group had access to ''fair'' insurance markets, where
Regardless of asset market prices, a consumer can always meet her tax obligation when the value of money is less than p m g in every state. Hence the set of money prices that would be consistent with equilibrium if members of the group were not allowed to trade assets (denoted N g ) provides an inner bound for the set P m : These bounding results are formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
When
Therefore, for any nonnegative weights fµ i g that sum to unity; we have
so that (8) holds for all consumers in the group and p m 2 P 
Therefore replacing p 0 g with ¼ moves weight from higher values of p m to lower values of p m , reducing the value of the sum. This implies that
holds, so that p m 2 F g and P m g µ F g holds. To show that this containment is also proper, it suffices to establish that there exists an " > 0
Suppose that this claim is not true. Then there exists a sequence " 1 ; " 2 ; : : : converging to zero such that p m " is consistent with equilibrium at every point in the sequence. For each "; denote the equilibrium contingent claims price p
14 Then the sequence p 0 g (s 1 ; ") must not be bounded away from ¼(s 1 ); or else a contradiction to (10) would occur for small enough ": Therefore there must exist a subsequence " which can be rewritten as 
Negative Taxation of a Group
The results are qualitatively reversed in the remaining case, where
Within the group, the consumption good is now more scarce in the states with lower prices of money.
The following lemma is exactly symmetric to Lemma 3 and is stated without proof.
Lemma 4 When
P h2g ¿ h < 0; for any two states s i and s j ;
Consumption is now less expensive in deflationary states, where a taxed consumer must make large purchases in order to pay his tax. When the price of money becomes high in a particular state, asset market prices now move in favor of a taxed consumer so that he can withstand higher money price vectors without going bankrupt than would be the case if p 0 g held. The result of this change is that the set of money prices consistent with equilibrium for group g is enlarged so that it now contains F g :
Proposition 4
Proof. The first relation is essentially that established in Corollary 1. For the second, take any reducing the value of the sum. Therefore
must also hold, which implies p m 2 P An interesting item of note here is that, in this case, the set P 
Corollary 2 When
P h2g ¿ h < 0; P m g is not convex.
Equilibrium Allocations
The previous section characterized the set of money prices consistent with equilibrium; the objective of this section is to characterize the resulting set of equilibrium allocations. This is done by providing versions of the two welfare theorems which combine to exactly characterize the set of allocations generated by any feasible fiscal policy ¿ 2 F: With segmented asset markets, the standard welfare theorems do not hold and equilibrium allocations, as demonstrated above, need not be Pareto optimal. There are two properties that distinguish equilibrium allocations here. The first is that, given the total allocation to each group, the distribution of that allocation must be Pareto optimal within the group. This follows from the assumption that there is a complete asset market in which all group members can trade. The second property is that the total allocation to each group in each state must be attainable through the type of fiscal policy considered here. These two properties are formalized as follows. [c
Definition
for some¸¸0 that is common to all groups.
Note that if both¸(s i ) and¸(s j ) are positive and their ratio is given by¸i j , the NNTP conditions
=¸i j¸0 for all g:
NNTP characterizes the set of group-level allocations that are attainable through fiscal policy. To see this, take c 0 to be the endowment point !;¸(s i ) to be p m (s i ); and k g to be the net tax on group g: Then equation (12) can be written
which is to say that the aggregate consumption of the group in each state is generated by some non-negative money prices p m : The NNTP property simply requires that these money prices be the same for each group.
The following propositions verify that POG and NNTP do indeed jointly characterize the set of equilibrium allocations.
Proposition 5 Any equilibrium allocation of E(!; ¿ ; G) is (i) Pareto optimal within groups and (ii) a non-negative proportional transfer from !:
Proof. (i) Nothing more is involved that the usual proof of the first welfare theorem. Suppose c 0 Pareto dominates the equilibrium allocation c in some group g; and that
Then at equilibrium prices,
with strict inequality for some h in g: But then summing across all consumers in the group yields
which contradicts equation (13) .
(ii) For every group,
Therefore defining¸= p m and k g = P h2g ¿ h shows that equation (12) is satisfied.
Proposition 6
Given ! and G, any allocation that is Pareto optimal within groups and is a nonnegative proportional transfer from ! is an equilibrium of E(!; ¿ ; G) for some ¿ 2 F:
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Proof. Let c denote such an allocation. Since it is POG, there exists a unique price vector p 0 g supporting it in each asset market. For each consumer and for any p m > 0; set
so that the boundary of the budget set defined by equation (3) goes through c h : This is then the consumer's optimal choice. Note that ¿ is balanced and hence bonafide. It remains to be shown that there exist money prices such that markets clear in each group. Summing equation (14) over consumers in group g yields
For any group with
h2g ! h for all s i ; so that the asset market for that group clears regardless of p m : For groups with P h2g ¿ h 6 = 0; we must have X
h2g
(! h ¡ c h (s i )) 6 = 0 for some state s i ;
so that in the NNTP property, k g 6 = 0 and¸(s i ) > 0 for some s i : Suppose (without loss of generality) that¸(s 1 ) > 0: Then we have for s i = s 2 ; : : : ; s n :
Combining this with equation (15) yields
; which simplifies to
For any other¸(s i ) > 0; a symmetric argument gives
and markets clear in every group. If, on the other hand,¸(s i ) = 0; then P h2g (! h ¡ c h (s i )) = 0 for every group and setting p m (s i ) = 0 ensures market clearing.
Since markets clear in every group and the tax policy is balanced, there is also aggregate market needed to be set, so that an equilibrium with p m normalized so that, say, E[p m ] = 1 could be constructed (cf. Balasko and Shell [7] , Proposition 3.3). These propositions provide the link between the amount of nominal volatility and the amount of real volatility. Once the set of equilibrium money prices P m is determined, for each element p m 2 P m it is easy to calculate the aggregate after-tax resources in each group using equation (6) . Asset market equilibrium then delivers an optimal allocation of these resources across the members of the group. Conversely, starting from any POG allocation that satisfies the NNTP property, it is possible to construct a fiscal policy ¿ that delivers this allocation as an equilibrium for some p m 2 P m :
Concluding Remarks
This paper has introduced the participation group approach to modelling asset market segmentation and provided a characterization of the set of money prices consistent with the existence of competitive equilibrium in a single-commodity general equilibrium model. It has shown how fiscal policy and asset market segmentation interact to determine the amount of sunspot-induced volatility that can occur in the equilibrium price level and in equilibrium consumption. The results provide a foundation for the earlier work of Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Shell [8] and the subsequent work of Keister [17] by showing that important qualitative properties derived using two states of nature and identical, logarithmic preferences are preserved in the general case.
The results indicate how redistribution policies can have a destabilizing effect on an economy.
If markets are segmented in such a way that there is a nonzero net tax on some groups, then consumption of the members of these groups will depend on the value of money. Since this value can always vary with the realization of a sunspot variable, consumption is made excessively volatile.
Knowledge of the set of equilibrium money prices (section 4) and the way in which nominal volatility translates into real volatility (section 5) allows one to analyze the level of destabilization that a particular policy may cause. This resembles the tradeoff between equality and efficiency that arises in models where the only available tax instruments are distortionary. 16 In both cases a movement away from the Pareto frontier accompanies any redistribution attempt. The most notable difference is that taxes in this model are lump sum, so that there are no distortionary effects involved. Instead, the redistribution combines with asset market segmentation to create equilibrium asset prices that are ''distorted'' from their perfect-market values.
An obvious generalization of this analysis that may prove interesting is the extension to models with many commodities. This would introduce the possibility of wealth effects of the type demonstrated by Peck [20] , which can affect the qualitative properties of set of equilibrium money prices.
This is left for future research.
